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This paper is based on ethnographic fieldwork at an obstetric ultrasound unit in Denmark and 
explores the few, intense minutes of clinical interaction following a high-risk screening result 
for Down’s syndrome. The category of high-risk transforms the routine ultrasound into a 
situation of inescapable choice, where the health of the fetus is questioned and decisions must 
be made. The clinical interactions following a high-risk result are investigated as processes of 
production, and the concepts of logic of choice and the logic of care are employed as analytical 
tools for identifying different rationales at play in the situation. The analysis shows that 
sonographers and women/couples collaboratively engage in logics of choice and care. Their 
mutual aim is to make the high-risk results meaningful and manageable so that a decision can 
be made. In this process initiative is shifted back and forth. Through a logic of care, complexity 
is reduced and statistics transformed by emphasising certain interpretations and leaving others 
unspoken. However, the logic of choice is also collectively maintained by positioning the 
women/couples as decision-makers. We argue that in the obstetric ultrasound unit, the logic of 
choice provides a powerful frame, with the logic of care filling in the gaps and discontinuities to 
facilitate decisions. In this context, the logics are complementary rather than competing, and 
thus our analysis add new perspectives to the original concepts. In sum, the logics of choice 
and care provide a valuable analytical tool for interpreting and understanding the complex and 
collaborative practices of clinical interaction. 
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In this paper, we explore a few minutes of clinical interaction at an obstetric ultrasound unit in 
Denmark. The interaction takes place between sonographers and pregnant women following a 
high-risk screening result for Down’s syndrome. It is an intense situation in which the health of 
the fetus is questioned and where decisions about how to respond to the risk must be made. 
We investigate this complex interaction by means of ‘a close reading of practice’ (Rhodes 
1990) and argue that in this context decision-making is the result of a collaborative effort. 
 
Denmark has a tax-financed, free-for-all health-care system through which all pregnant 
women are offered prenatal care, including a first-trimester risk screening (FTS) for Down’s 
syndrome. The FTS is a combined screening (Petersen et al. 2014) that calculates a single risk 
estimate based on maternal age, serum markers (maternal blood test), and an ultrasound 
measurement of the fetal nuchal translucency. The nuchal translucency is measured at the 
first-trimester ultrasound scan, where a general examination of the fetus is also performed. If 
the woman/couple wish, the risk estimate is calculated by the attending sonographer (nurse or 
midwife) at the end of the scan. The FTS result is immediately available and presented in the 
form of a statistical risk figure. A risk higher than 1:300 is considered ‘high risk’ and generates 
an offer of invasive diagnostic testing (chorionic villus sample, CVS). The diagnostic testing 
provides a definitive answer regarding chromosomal abnormalities, but also involves a 1% risk 
of miscarriage due to the invasive procedure. Thus, the unsuspecting, worried woman/couple 
must weigh up concerns about the health of the baby against the risk of miscarriage and 
decide for or against diagnostic testing. 
 
Women’s reasons for and experiences with participating in screening are well-examined (Reid 
et al. 2009). Fewer studies explicitly address women’s experiences of a high-risk screening 
result (Baillie et al. 2000; Heyman et al. 2006), and the vast majority of them are based on 
retrospective interviews. Consequently, they do not address the complexities and subtleties of 




and experiences of partners and professionals.  Despite some insightful exceptions (see Pilnick 
& Zayts 2012; 2014), the interactional processes through which high risk is communicated, 
negotiated and decided upon in remain to be substantially investigated. This paper is based on 
extensive fieldwork and detailed observations of first trimester ultrasound examinations ending 
in a high-risk FTS result. Our aim is to investigate the subtle and complex ways in which high-
risk is moulded and managed by sonographers and high-risk women/couples. In the remainder 
of this introduction, we outline our approach to clinical interaction and the theoretical concepts 
used for analysing these interactions. 
 
Several studies have documented pregnant how women/couples desire prenatal ultrasound to 
find reassurance that their pregnancy is developing as expected and that their baby is healthy 
(Rapp 1999; Reid et al. 2009). Within anthropological studies of reproduction, feminist 
scholars have been critical of the role of medico-technical interventions such as ultrasound 
imagery and prenatal diagnosis in the disruption of women’s reproductive agency. The overall 
argument is that the biomedical technologies shift focus from women’s embodied experience of 
pregnancy to doctors’ biomedical evaluation (Rothman 1993; Davis-Floyd 1992; Han 2013). 
This approach has in general been very critical of Western biomedicine as a dominant system 
of knowledge. Critiques concern the biomedical construction of the female body, issues of 
medicalisation and surveillance, and the relations of power between patients and professionals 
(Lupton 2003). The strength of this perspective is the critical approach to modern medical 
knowledge, practice and institutions, showing its power in shaping lives and societies (Lock 
and Nguyen 2010). However, these studies also tend to represent biomedicine as a culturally 
coherent community with professionals positioned as authoritative and compliant 
representatives of this culture. Consequently, the clinical encounter is often analysed as a 
competition or struggle between different positions or contrasting cultures, where the patient’s 
problem and position is reduced and appropriated by the professional to fit biomedical 





However, in recent medical anthropology there has been increased focus on the eclectic and 
pragmatic diversity of biomedicine and biomedical practices (Atkinson 1995; Saunders 2008; 
Jutel 2011). What these approaches have in common, is an analytical approach to biomedical 
knowledge and practice as negotiated, locally accomplished and contextually embedded. This 
entails increased analytical focus on doctors as both individual persons and clinical experts, 
and on patients as both embodied and biological citizens (Rose & Novas 2005). Consequently, 
instead of approaching clinical encounters as exchange or competition, our analytical approach 
has been to analyse them as processes of production. Instead of investigating ‘high risk’ as a 
process where information is exchanged between sonographers and women/couples, our 
analytical focus is on ‘high-risk’ as an enacted, social construction, whose meaning, implication 
and reality is generated in the clinical interaction through practice.  
 
In Denmark, as in many other countries, participation in prenatal screening is based on 
informed choice (Danish Board of Health 2004). The paradigm of informed choice serves as a 
model for the doctor-patient relationship where the role of the clinician is to provide adequate 
and non-directive information, free of professional and moral judgement. On the basis of this, 
the pregnant woman must make an autonomous choice, free of influence from potentially 
authoritative end paternalistic professionals (Beauchamp and Childress 1994; Petersen and 
Lupton 1996). Scholars have argued that the ideal of informed choice may be particularly 
predominant within prenatal screening, where practises of non-directiveness and patient 
autonomy are a safeguard against accusations of eugenics (Petersen 1999; Koch & Svendsen 
2005) 
 
Informed choice is also a prevailing topic in prenatal screening research where numerous 
studies have investigated women’s level of informed consent prior to participating in prenatal 
screening (van den Berg et al. 2006), and their interpretation of the high-risk status (Baillie et 
al. 2000; Heyman et al. 2006). Others have investigated professionals’ success and failure in 




studies all document the difficulties of the everyday implementation of informed choice in 
prenatal screening, yet they maintain the assumption that non-directiveness and autonomous 
choice is a realistic and desirable goal (Koch & Svendsen 2005). However, as several scholars 
have argued, the ideal of informed choice and its underlying assumptions are deeply 
problematic (Petersen 1999; Koch & Svendsen 2005). Firstly, biomedical knowledge is not 
neutral but embedded in interaction and produced through interpretation and contextualisation. 
It is also argued that patients do not transcend their socialisation to make ‘autonomous’ 
choices (Mackenzie 2008), but are always making decisions in relation to their social and 
personal worlds. Nevertheless, despite scholarly critique, non-directiveness and autonomous 
choice remains an influention, clinical ideal for prenatal screening in Denmark as well as other 
indistrialised countries.  
 
In Denmark, more than 90 % of all pregnant women have FTS performed during their first 
trimester ultrasound scan, and approximately 5 % of them receive a high-risk FTS result 
(Danish national database of fetal medicine 2012). Studies have found that Danish women 
have a relatively high level of knowledge and predominantly positive attitudes towards FTS 
(Bangsgaard and Tabor 2013). Since the nationwide introduction of the FTS in 2004, the 
number of children born with Down’s syndrome has dropped significantly. However, the FTS 
continues to generate popular and professional debates in Denmark. Newspaper headlines 
such as ‘There are few children like Elliot left’ and ‘Children with Down's syndrome are widely 
deselected’ reflect ambiguous societal values regarding selective abortion of fetuses with 
Down’s syndrome. Often, doctors and the health care system are implicitly or explicitly 
accused of promoting eugenics and designer babies. These ongoing debates may reinforce 
clinical emphasis on non-directiveness as a safeguard against accusations of eugenics.  
 
Dutch ethnographer and philosopher Annemarie Mol (2008), identifies the pervasive discourse 
of non-directiveness and informed choice as ‘the logic of choice’; a result of the influential, 




observing the ‘messiness of mundane practices’ (Mol 2008:43) in clinical interactions, Mol 
identifies ‘the logic care’ as an alternative, everyday approach to clinical interaction. Mol builds 
her argument on the case of a chronic illness – diabetes – which demands continuing 
collaboration between patient and health professionals and argues that the logic of care 
incorporates a collaborative, practical figuring out of what to do in the situation at hand. It 
incorporates both professional knowledge and patients’ experiences – a ‘shared doctoring’ – 
where facts are not easily separated from values and interpretation.  The logic of care is an 
attuned approach, where the professional is not an objective and neutral fact provider, and 
where the patient is not the only one who interprets the facts and makes choices. Mol 
identifies and articulates the logic of care through contrast and comparison with the logic of 
choice to distil the logics as theoretical concepts (Mol 2008:11). In real life, they may interfere 
and intermingle, but, as Mol mentions, more often they clash (Ibid:1). She invites us to 
investigate the possible interferences of choice and care in other contexts.  
 
Care practices have been investigated in a number of contexts, including in prenatal care 
(Schwennesen & Koch 2012). However, in this analysis, we go beyond identifying ‘care’ 
practices only, and address the intermingling and overlapping of both care and choice in the 
context of prenatal screening and high risk results. Responding to Mol’s call, our aim is to 
explore how high-risk screening results are practised, negotiated and decided upon in a 
context defined by the clinical ideals of informed choice and by the mundane messiness of 
everyday clinical interactions. We argue that in the ultrasound examination room, logics of 
choice and care are not so easily distinguished and that they are more complementary than 




The analysis draws upon a total of 5½ months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 




research explored the interactions and communication between pregnant women/couples and 
sonographers following a high-risk screening result. Data were primarily generated through 
participant observation, that is, by following the daily work of sonographers at the unit and 
participating in examinations, invasive procedures, genetic counselling and coffee-breaks. 
Central to the fieldwork was the opportunity to observe more than 400 FTSs of which 21 
resulted in a high-risk result. SL followed 20 of these women/couples in their subsequent 
appointments at the ultrasound unit. The consent of the women/couples was renegotiated at 
each encounter. All 20 women/couples had participated in in-depth, qualitative interviews by 
mid-pregnancy and six of them were also interviewed after delivery. Furthermore, seven 
sonographers were interviewed. During interviews, having a common ground of shared 
experience from the ultrasound unit provided a valuable opportunity to discuss and reflect on 
specific situations and interactions. Insights from the formal interviews continuously informed 
the ongoing participant observations – and vice versa. Interviews were recorded and 
transcribed verbatim. Both interview transcripts and field notes were coded, and themes, 
patterns and connections between codes were identified, investigated and settled. The present 
analysis draws primarily on the field notes, and throughout the article, field note excerpts 




Merged agendas at the FTS 
As the pregnant woman takes off her coat, Helen (the sonographer) explains the 
purpose of the examination and adds: ‘I can see that your GP has indicated in 
the file that you want a risk assessment for Down’s syndrome, is that correct?’ 
The woman nods yes, and as she lies down on the bed, Helen explains that the 
outcome is a statistical number, not a definitive answer, and introduces the 




then it’s just “good-bye and see you later”.’ The couple chuckle. ‘And if it’s a 
high risk, well, then we will discuss the options available to you. We’ll deal with 
that, if it becomes relevant, OK?’ 
 
This is the standard introduction used in various forms by all sonographers at the ultrasound 
unit because, as sonographer Ingrid explained, ‘I have to make sure that this is what they 
(the couple) want. Once I’ve given them the risk assessment, I can’t take back that 
knowledge’. With the introduction, sonographers intentionally frame the situation in a logic of 
choice by repeating the couple’s consent and by pointing to the potential future options in 
case of a high risk. 
 
During the ultrasound examination, the sonographer guides the couple through the blurry 
black-and-white ultrasound images on the monitor: ‘There’s the little heart beating’, she says, 
while the couple smile and squeeze each other’s hands. Several studies have documented 
how the fetal image on the screen generates a strong sense of pleasure and joy and has the 
potential to ‘accelerate the pregnancy’ (Lupton 2013; Mitchell and Georges 1998; Rapp 1999). 
The playful comments made by couples during the scan, such as ‘honey, I think we have a 
future soccer player’ or ‘look, it’s gonna have your nose’ reveal how the ultrasound images of 
the fetus are infused with social meanings of an imagined and desired future as parents and 
as family (Mattingly 1998). Janelle Taylor (2008) identifies the sonogram as a ‘hybrid 
practise’ that straddles the needs of biomedicine with the wants of consumer society and 
point to the potential tension between those two. Similarly, in her analysis of men’s empirical 
accounts of the prenatal ultrasound, Draper (2002) identifies a potential ‘clashing of world 
views’ (p. 787) between the pregnant couple’s expectation of the ultrasound as a social event 
and the expert paradigm of the ultrasound as a diagnostic event. However, at the ultrasound 
unit, we see these ‘views’ merging rather than clashing. As sonographer Emma explained 
during a coffee-break, ‘Yes, it’s a fetus and we are here to examine it. But it is also their child. 




that bond and recognising that it’s a precious moment.’ Similarly, the FTS is not merely a 
social event for the couples; they too have a biomedical agenda. They are ‘biological citizens’ 
(Rose & Novas, 2005) and prepared to enter and work with biomedical discourses. While 
adoring the future soccer player, they actively question, investigate and interact with the 
biomedical information produced by sonographers in order to obtain knowledge about the 
health of their baby. Thus, rather than clashing, sonographers and pregnant women/couples 
collaborate to mix biomedical purpose with social and personal concerns. The ultrasound scan 
is not only an exchange of information, but also a sharing of doctoring (Mol 2008) in which 
the standard expert/lay positions are reconfigured and the logics of choice (presenting 
knowledge in order to advance reproductive choice) and care (imagining future parenthood) 
are enacted by both sonographers and women/couples. 
 
The turning point 
OK, what I’ve seen today looks fine (smiles), but I’m just gonna calculate those 
numbers for you, says Meredith and turns to the computer in the corner of the 
room. Anna gets dressed, quietly whispering something to Jacob. Both are smiling. 
Anna sits down on the end of the bed, while Jacob gathers their bags and coats. 
Then, almost in slow motion, Meredith turns on her chair and rolls it close to the 
couple. Jacob sits down next to Anna. Meredith stretches her arm out to turn on 
the lights and then says in a quiet, serious voice: ‘Well, Anna and Jacob, we need 
to have a little talk. Unfortunately, when I punch in the numbers you end up in 
“high risk” for Down's syndrome’. 
 
This last sentence marks a boundary. The classification as high-risk divides the ultrasound 
scan into a ‘before’ and ‘after’ (Jutel, 2011) as the situation is dramatically reshaped and new 
agendas are brought into play. Meredith gently strokes Anna’s arm and asks, ‘What do you 
think? Have you considered that this might happen?’ Evidently, sonographers have extensive 




them. They have a repertoire of communications, interpretations and options at hand, and in 
order to decide which ones to bring into play in this particular interaction, the sonographers 
engage in a constant involvement with and adaptation to the couple, inviting them to share 
their perspectives and ask ‘what are your feelings right now?’, and ‘have you thought about 
this?’ This allows the sonographer to guide the interaction in accordance with the specific 
couple and walk down the paths to which they point. Meredith’s question in the quote above 
enacts a logic of care, where she positions Anna and Jacob as knowledgeable interlocutors. 
Sonographers invite the women/couples to be the first to define this specific situation and thus 
initiate a situation of involvement and collaboration, where answers are not necessarily 
definitive or certain. This is a caring practice in which the unique history of the woman/couple 
is acknowledged as important; however, it is also a practice of choice in which the 
woman/couple can and should autonomously evaluate the risk presented to them. In 
Annemarie Mol’s analysis of choice and care in the case of diabetes, she carves out the concept 
of care through comparison and contrast with choice (Mol 2008: 8). They represent two 
different (and often competing) ways of dealing with biomedical problems. In the case of 
prenatal screening, we see how care and choice sometimes overlap and support each other. 
 
At this point, most women/couples are visibly confused and saddened, and their first concern 
is to understand the numbers. Consequently, the conversation swarms with statistics, for 
example, ‘1:213 risk figure, 1:300 cut-off, 1:100 risk of miscarriage, 1:625 age-related risk’. 
Often, both the sonographer and the woman/couple suggest different ways to contextualise 
the statistics; for example, the partner converts the risk figure to a percentage, the 
sonographer brings forth the image of tickets in a lottery, or the couple will compare ‘their 
number' to the cut-off of 1:300. 
 
Lilly: ‘1:244, I don’t know… we just haven’t…’ 




Helen (sonographer): ‘Yes, and there is also 1:2 – that’s a tough one. 1:244 – 
that’s not so tough. The odds are good… 243 healthy children.’ 
 
On the one hand, Lilly and Stephen relates to the cut-off that officially categorises their result 
as high risk, which results in the offer of invasive diagnostics. On the other hand, they are 
invited to interpret the risk assessment: ‘is 1:244 a high risk for you?’ (Helen, sonographer). 
So, women/couples have the choice to (and are invited to) override the cut-off and decide that 
1:244 is not a high risk and that invasive diagnostics are needless. However, they cannot 
avoid the high-risk result as such or avoid making a decision about what to do. The high-risk 
result makes a situation of choice inescapable. 
 
Along with the efforts to deal with the statistics, another question often arises: Why? Why did 
we end up as high risk? To answer this question, sonographers usually invoke the components 
in the risk algorithm: ‘The blood test is a bit skewed, so that’s what tips the scale’ (Meredith), 
or ‘Your ultrasound and blood test are fine, so it’s really your age that is the “villain” here’ 
(Rebecca). These are compelling and authoritative answers, pointing to the complicated 
biochemical lab results and the complex algorithm behind the risk figure. Most women/couples 
accept these explanations as sonographers chain the elusive statistics to something tangible, 
and convincingly link the uncertainty to unruly hormone levels and aged egg cells. However, 
some women continue to question whether the high-risk result could have been avoided if they 
had done something differently. Sonographers often terminate these inquiries by calling the 
result ‘unfortunate’ or even ‘bad luck’. While ‘bad luck’ is virtually empty of explanatory 
content (Ramløv 1986), its contextual value lies in the framing of high risk as an unfortunate 
and unexplainable random event that the woman could not have prevented or adverted. ‘Bad 
luck’ serves to alleviate women from feeling guilty or responsible for the high-risk outcome, 
but a reference to ‘bad luck’ also effectively shuts down other attempts to discuss or question 
the statistics. The risk figure is what Latour (1999) identifies as ‘black box’ of scientific 




the situation of choice. Somatic explanations and fatalistic practical reasoning do not radically 
attune to the uncertainties of the women/couple but rather to their position as decision-makers. 
 
Reducing complexity through collaboration 
Decision-making is inescapable, but when weighing up the risk of miscarriage against the 
worries about the condition of the fetus, statistics do not provide the answer. In her 
investigation of the cultural dimensions of risk, Boholm (2003) remind us that there is no 
simple translation from epidemiologically identified risks and probabilities to ‘situated risk’, that 
is, the way risk estimates are actually understood and contextualised by people in social 
settings. In the ultrasound examination room, the numbers do not address in any satisfactory 
way what is at stake in this situation and/or give any directions for how to manage it. 
 
In a logic of choice, the sonographers position the woman/couple as knowing subjects and 
autonomous decision-makers, however, being in charge in the unknown territory of risk figures 
and jeopardised future can be lonely and difficult (Mol 2008). Consequently, several of the 
women/couples turn to the sonographer and ask, ‘What do you think? What is your advice?’ 
These questions challenge the logic of choice, in which giving direct advice is inappropriate, 
and concurrently demonstrate acknowledgement by the woman/couple of the sonographer’s 
extensive professional knowledge and experience. Schwennesen and Koch (2012) find that 
‘authority is trustingly delegated’ to the sonographer. Similarly, we find that the 
woman’s/couple’s request for guidance addressed the very knowledge differences that the 
logic of choice is intended to eliminate. However, we understand these requests as an 
invitation to collaborate rather than as a delegation of authority. Asking for advice shows how 
the logic of care is not only something health professionals use to engage with patients; it is 
also something patients enact and promote in their interactions with professionals, for example, 
when they position decision-making as a collaborative practice. In subsequent interviews, 
several women/couples explained that they did not want the sonographers to make choices for 




logic of care and logic of choice; they expect and appreciate making their own decisions, but 
do not expect to make them in the vacuum sometimes implied by a strict logic-of-choice 
paradigm. 
 
In responding to their invitation, sonographers walk a tight-rope in balancing the logics of care 
and choice: promoting autonomy and choice, while not leaving the woman/couple alone in 
unknown territory. By attuning to the cues of the woman/couple, sonographers emphasise 
certain meanings and interpretations while underplaying or silencing others. This is a process 
of reducing and transforming a complex situation into manageable platforms of meaning from 
which a decision can subsequently be made. 
 
Following Lilly and Stephen’s quiet discussion of the 1:244 risk figure, silence falls. 
When sonographer Helen asks for their thoughts, Lilly shrugs her shoulders and 
Stephen mentions that he actually thinks 1:300 (the cut-off) is a high risk. Helen 
offers an interpretation: ‘I think, what you need to consider is the seed of 
uncertainty that we have planted with this risk figure, OK’. 
 
Stephen mentions the cut-off and Helen shifts the attention to the category of high risk rather 
than the specific (abstract and debatable) risk figure. Similarly, in a subsequent interview, 
Nicolas (partner) recalled, ‘What mattered most was that they pointed us out as high risk. We 
ended up in the bad group.’ Sonographers and women/couples collectively reproduce the high-
risk category as authoritative and powerful, regardless of the specific statistical probability. 
This consequently reduces the complexity of the situation and condenses it to the main issue, 
namely that what needs to be dealt with by the couples is not necessarily the individual risk, 
but the fact of being ‘pointed out’ and the ‘seed of worry’ planted by the categorisation. 
 
Another example of reducing complexity is to focus on the immediate future of the pregnancy. 




(Meredith) responded, ‘The most important thing is that you can reconcile to whatever decision 
you make. And that you can feel happy and safe throughout the pregnancy. That’s the most 
important.’ Similar reflections are often initiated by the women/couples: 
 
Katie is sitting on the hospital bed, ‘what do you think?’ she asks her husband, 
Ruben. ‘It’s pretty close…’ Ruben responds and both of them look up at the 
sonographer, Ingrid. ‘Maybe you should go home and digest this whole thing’, 
she says, ‘think it over. 1:297. We’re not in a hurry’. Katie hesitates and Ingrid 
starts to explain the options of additional ultrasound, and maybe amniocentesis, 
if the couples should change their mind later. Katie interrupts: ‘No, let’s have it 
done. I just know I won’t be able to leave this alone (Ruben: ‘I know, you 
won’t’). I’ll spend all of this pregnancy thinking and worrying. I’ll go crazy 
(Ruben: ‘You’ll drive me crazy!’)’. 
 
By accentuating the importance of having a happy and safe pregnancy (whether undergoing 
invasive diagnostics or not), sonographers and women/couples relate to the latters’ immediate 
lived experiences. The temporal context is folded (Mattingly 1998) and the future towards 
which action must be directed is situated in the spheres of known, everyday life. The 
immediate future of the pregnancy is given primary concern, whereas more distant and 
uncertain futures, such as having a child with Down’s syndrome, are only rarely and briefly 
addressed at this point. Sonographers and women/couples collectively negotiate the complex 
high-risk situation by simplifying and ascribing certain meanings (e.g., categorisation is 
powerful, uncertainty causes worry) while ignoring others (e.g., risk of miscarriage, disability). 
 
As Pilnick and Zayts (2014) observe, the uncertainty of the risk figure allows for two 
simultaneous interpretations and two different rationales; it can be interpreted as a rationale 
for further testing (uncertain results must be confirmed) or for no further testing (uncertain 




implicitly work to legitimise invasive diagnostics. Engaging a logic of care, the women/couples 
use feedback from the sonographer to test their personal reasons and the social acceptability 
of being willing to risk the pregnancy for a 1:297 risk of chromosomal abnormality. 
 
The risk of miscarriage is the paramount concern for high-risk women/couples. To Anna and 
Jacob, the sonographer (Meredith) said, ‘Yes, there is a risk. We are obliged to say that it’s a 
half to one per cent. It’s there. But our doctors are very good. They do this every day.’ First, 
by using ‘obliged to say’, Meredith points to some obscure authority beyond this particular 
examination room, and even beyond the ultrasound unit. This authority is challenged by 
reference to the sonographer’s professional, everyday experiences of invasive diagnostics – 
discreetly suggesting an actual lower risk of procedure-related miscarriages. Second, she 
challenges the statistics by emphasising a local expertise that may (or may not) influence the 
risk of miscarriage: competent doctors who do this every day. With these comments, she 
localises the statistics and engages the trust of the woman/couple in the hospital in order to 
downplay the risk of miscarriage. This can be interpreted as nudging women towards the CVS, 
thereby neglecting non-directive information; however, it may also be construed as the logic of 
care, as sharing the burden and inducing hope without making promises. 
 
In summary, sonographers and women/couples collectively attend to values and reduce 
complexity by emphasising certain interpretations and future scenarios, leaving others 
unspoken. This can potentially be construed as violating the ethics of autonomy and value-free 
information. However, in line with Schwennesen and Koch (2012), we found that these 
interpretations are exactly what make the random and meaningless situation of high risk 
meaningful and manageable. We add to this that the whole situation is directed towards a 
certain end, namely, taking a decision. From the standpoint of the sonographer and the 
woman/couple, they need to come to terms with the uncertain situation in a way that will allow 





Coming to a decision 
Sonographer Julie has only just mentioned the 1:223 screening result when Sofia 
turns to her and says ‘yeah, we want the CVS’, then turns back to exchange a 
searching look with Mads to confirm. ‘Don’t we, babe?’. Julie smiles and says, 
‘that’s fine, but let me just talk you through this, OK. So you know what you are 
getting into and what your options are’. 
 
Observing the interactions at the ultrasound unit, it was apparent that decision-making does 
not necessarily follow from information; sometimes it is the other way round, and 
women/couples voice a decision only seconds after – or even before – the sonographer has 
fully explained the risk figure. Even though the high-risk situation is an unequalled situation in 
which most women/couples have no prior experience or established management strategies 
(Boholm 2003), and even if they initially need feedback to make the high-risk status 
meaningful and manageable, most still have a gut feeling, a spontaneous concern and/or a 
more or less explicit personal conviction about what to do in this situation, all of which results 
in ‘prompt’ decisions. Interestingly, these prompt (or ‘default’) responses are generally not 
supported by the sonographers, who often remind the woman/couple that this is a serious 
situation requiring contemplation of the understandings and alternatives at hand. 
Sonographers thereby enact the logic of choice by which decision-making requires more than 
spontaneous gut feelings and rather a weighing up of the evidence to arrive at an informed 
choice. Consequently, they initiate a short dialogue about the risk assessment and the options 
available, of which some examples have been mentioned above. Only then, is the final decision 
established. 
 
Of the 20 women/couples followed in this study, 17 decided to have invasive diagnostics and 
12 of these requested to have it done immediately. Sonographers will often advocate for an 
appointment the following day; having time to ‘digest’ and ‘talk it over’ serves as their 




requiring contemplation. Furthermore, they invoke the limits of the hospital setting and 
position ‘home’ and ‘everyday life’ as important factors when making important decisions. 
Finally, a night at home is introduced to the women/couples as an opportunity to ‘calm down’ 
and ‘feel certain’, resulting in a less stressful invasive procedure (for both professionals and 
women/couples). 
 
Coming to a decision is the pinnacle of the interaction and represents an intermingling of both 
choice and care rationales. On the one hand, women/couples are given space to connect to 
lived experiences of everyday life – even if that is not their initial desire (they want to get it 
over with) – enacting a logic of care where the professional sometimes does know what is best 
for the patient. On the other hand, the sonographer’s insistence on time to digest the 
information also enacts a logic of choice as a way to secure patient autonomy and reduce 
hospital influence on the woman’s/couple’s final decision. Going home serves both ends. In this 
example, care is not so easily distinguishable from choice, or vice versa. 
 
In subsequent interviews, the women/couples generally express a high degree of satisfaction 
with the sonographers and the way the dialogue around high risk was conducted. They all felt 
that they had made their own decision and that alternatives were made available to them. 
They appreciated that the decision was theirs to make – even if a difficult one – and valued the 
opportunity to think the situation through with the sonographer. Both sonographers and 
women/couples reproduce the logic of choice, but it is not in any simple way disconnected 
from or in opposition to the logic of care that also flows through the clinical interactions that 
follow a high-risk screening result. 
 
Concluding discussion 
In this article, we have drawn on the logics of choice and care as analytical tools for 
illuminating the interactions between sonographers and pregnant women/couples following a 





First, the logic of choice paradigm played a defining role in the way the FTS was framed and 
implemented in Denmark. Although we have identified care as continually running through the 
interaction, it is also evident that in this whole situation, a logic of choice is heavily scripted. In 
Mol’s case of diabetes there is no ultimate solution or cure; however, in the context of FTS, the 
CVS promises a solution that will replace uncertainty and ambiguity with solid and definitive 
knowledge about the fetal chromosomes. In their analysis of ‘social technologies’, Jöhncke et 
al. (2004) show how solutions (specific technologies, interventions) actively produce problems 
by providing a frame within which a specific condition can be identified and formulated as a 
problem. Uncertainties in life (e.g. the risk of carrying a fetus with Down’s syndrome) are 
considered inevitable circumstances until promises of change or solution reframe them as a 
‘problem’ that demands attention and action. Thus, technologies are productive. Because the 
identification of the problem is intrinsically linked to its solution, the FTS technology creates 
and legitimises specific understandings (1:300 is a high risk) and choices (to (dis)confirm the 
identified risk). Like other surveillance and screening technologies, prenatal screening is based 
on an assumption that knowledge provides opportunities to act and control. Several studies 
have shown how the mere availability of risk information links to a moral imperative to prevent 
adverse outcomes and make choices towards control and elimination of risk (Petersen 1999; 
Svendsen 2005).  
 
Thus, when 85 % of Danish high-risk women/couples decide to have the CVS (Petersen et al. 
2014), we suggest that is it not due to biased information and paternalistic sonographers, but 
rather that the FTS technology and whole situation is ‘biased’; embedded in specific and 
contingent social, historical, political and economical contexts and pointing towards the 
imperative of knowing through the technology of the CVS (Jöncke et al. 2004; Koch & 





However, our findings show how the clinical interactions works towards transcending this 
inherent bias to produce a situation where not agreeing with the high-risk status and not 
having a CVS are also a meaningful and legitimate choice. Sonographers and women/couples 
enact the risk figure as a neutral and inescapable fact open for interpretation; they exchange 
alternative interpretations and test different options. However, simultaneously, the weight and 
authority of the high-risk category is acknowledged when couples and sonographers refer to 
‘being in the bad group’ or ‘planting seeds of uncertainty.’  In our specific context, logics of 
choice and care are not so easily distinguished, but continue to be valuable tools for bringing 
forth the detailed and subtle, conflicting and collaborative ways through which the FTS 
technology is appropriated and negotiated in clinical interaction. 
 
Second, logics of care support and complement the logic of choice. Our findings show how the 
sonographer and the woman/couple organise their practices around and towards the logic of 
choice; they share information guided towards decision-making. In this process of coming to a 
decision, initiative and authority is shifted back and forth and interpretations are tested and 
shared; sonographer Meredith mentions competent doctors, and pregnant Katie suggests that 
the uncertainty will drive her crazy. In the ultrasound examination room uncertainties are 
addressed - not by intellectualised thinking, but through involvement, experiment and probing 
responses in order to gain the kind of understanding that is necessary to deal with problems as 
they arise (Dewey 1960). In the logic of choice, this may be construed as paternalistic 
authority, as a failure to live up to clinical ideals of neutral information and distanced 
professionals. In a logic of choice, the doctor provides the facts, while patients add values and 
personal interpretations (Mol 2008:439). However, we argue that these interpretive and 
collaborative practises of care are exactly what allow the women/couples to develop a situated 
and meaningful understanding of and response to the uncertainties generated by the high-risk 





Thus, we suggest that our findings add to Mol’s original formulations by identifying a context 
where the logics actually complement each other rather than clash. Logic of care allows a 
dynamic, relational interaction and experimentation, and in this particular context care is not 
in opposition to the logic of choice, but supports and fills in the gaps that allow choice to be 
practised. The logic of care, enacted by both sonographers and women/couples, embraces the 
differences in knowledge and experience to establish a meaningful understanding from where 
decision can be made.  
 
This finding has potentially important clinical implications. Within prenatal screening the ideal 
of informed choice is so strong that it almost functions according to an inverse logic as 
described by Høyer and Lynöe (2006:20): If clinicians do not support and provide a strictly 
non-directive approach, then they must be paternalistic, and vice versa. As a result, the messy 
and mundane everyday life, where sonographers balance informed choice while also taking 
care of worried and confused couples can be very difficult to address as other than failure and 
latent coercion (Williams et al. 2002). By carving out a language through, and for, caring 
practices, Mol attempts to contribute to healthcare by strengthening and revitalising the logic 
of care (Mol 2008: 92). We have shown how the logic of care runs through and is necessary in 
clinical interactions following a high-risk FTS result and we argue that this value-laden, 
experiential, collaborative approach does not contaminate or coerce, but promotes and allows 
good, situated decision-making. We propose that the logic of care – as theoretical approach 
and tool for clinical reflection - can provide a legitimate and meaningful way of speaking of 
practices that are not strictly non-directive and support further development of caring, clinical 
practices within and in dialogue with the clinical ideals of informed choice.  
 
Third, we show how sonographers and women/couples practice both logics of care and choice 
during their interaction - working towards choice, and invoking care in the process. However, 
we also identify a small, interesting difference in their approaches. For the sonographer, who is 




because potential allegations (e.g., from patients, colleagues, management or the media) of 
coaxing patients towards certain (eugenic) decisions are always lurking. From a professional’s 
perspective, engaging in values and sharing responsibilities with patients must be carried out 
with great consideration (Williams 2002), whereas the women/couples patients have fewer 
reservations and concerns; they actively promote feedback and involvement of a wider range 
of knowledge and experience (Carrol et al. 2012). In his discussion of non-directiveness in 
genetic counselling, Seymour Kessler (1997) reminds us that attempts to influence us are 
ubiquitous in everyday life. The family, our colleagues, the media and car salesmen all try to 
influence our attitudes and actions and we expect them to.  We choose what to have for dinner, 
which party to vote for, and what car to buy without our autonomy or ability to evaluate 
suggestions and advice being compromised. Similarly, to the women/couples in our study, the 
involvement of professionals’ experiences does not compromise their ability to make their own 
decision. Thus, the logic of choice is less precarious and consequently enacted less 
dogmatically by the women/couples, who are not subjected to clinical guidelines of non-
directiveness. High-risk women/couples engage with the expert sonographer much like they 
engage with other trusted experts. Relations of trust are essential in this situation. Like other 
Scandinavian welfare systems, Denmark has a tradition of implied mutual responsibility within 
the health-care system and a cultural expectation that health care personnel can be trusted 
(Høyer & Lynöe, 2006). Also, the Danish health-care system is characterized by high patient-
satisfaction, as well as a tradition for relatively non-hierarchal doctor-patient relations. This 
may explain why Danish pregnant women/couples enter the obstetric ultrasound unit with an 
expectation of both logics of choice and logics of care and thus promote their collaboration in 
the clinical interaction.  
 
Our final point is less related to the logics of choice and care and more related to the value of 
fieldwork and focused attention on the complex, mundane and subtle details of everyday, 
clinical interaction. It is this approach that allows us to see how agendas are shared. Different 




engage in enacting the fetus as a biomedical object and a social being. Scholars have 
convincingly argued for the authoritative ways in which ultrasound imagery potentially produce 
powerful and normalising knowledge about both the fetus and parents (Mitchell and Georges 
1998; Lupton 2013). This potential should certainly be acknowledged; however, what the close 
reading of practice allows us to see in this specific context is the collaborative agenda and 
shared discourses of sonographers and women/couples, not just the reproduction of only one 
knowledge position. Lippmann (1999) and others (see for example Rapp 1999; Root & 
Browner 2001) have shown how pregnant women ‘reconcile’ various discourses and ways of 
knowing to create their own position, where statistical knowledge, clinical interactions and 
personal convictions are not competing sources of information, but different strands in the 
complex fabric that makes up women’s responses to prenatal screening (Lippman 1999: 269). 
In the ultrasound examination room both sonographers and women/couples engage in a 
similar process of reconciliation and transformation of knowledge. The sonographer’s 
enactment of the risk figure similarly interlaces with her personal and professional experience, 
social concerns and hopes for the future pregnancy of the woman/couple. Thus, in this 
particular context, women/couples and sonographers are positioned not as representatives of 
two different knowledge traditions, but as simultaneously engaged in a range of ways of 
knowing in the process of appropriating the risk figure to make it meaningful and manageable. 
We believe that continued empirical attention to shared experiences and collaborations 
practices in clinical interactions - alongside potential conflicts and differences - offers a fruitful 
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